

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA**

Knife Rights, Inc., Cameron Sjodin;  
David Draeger; and Kevin Crystal,

Plaintiffs,

v.

Keith Ellison, in his official capacity  
as Attorney General of the State of  
Minnesota; et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 0:24-cv-3749

**PLAINTIFFS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF  
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TO EXCLUDE EXPERT  
WITNESS TESTIMONY**

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## INTRODUCTION

This case presents a straightforward application of the Supreme Court’s Second Amendment framework. Minnesota criminalizes the possession of an entire class of common folding knives—switchblades—based on outdated assumptions and an invalidated judicial scrutiny level about their association with criminality.<sup>1</sup> Under *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) and *New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen*, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), Minnesota’s switchblade ban is unconstitutional.

Defendants’ opposition does not justify the ban. Instead, it attempts to rewrite the governing Second Amendment framework by imposing requirements that the Supreme Court has rejected—most notably, that Plaintiffs must show switchblades are commonly used in self-defense, rather than in common use for lawful purposes, and that arms may be banned based on generalized assertions of “dangerousness.” Those arguments contradict precedent and improperly shift the burden that *Bruen* places squarely on the government.

Applying the correct framework, switchblades are “arms” within the meaning of the Second Amendment. They are bearable, commonly owned

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<sup>1</sup> Manufacture and transfer are necessary predicates to possession; Plaintiffs’ standing applies equally.

folding knives that differ from other lawful knives only in their opening mechanism. *E.g.*, *Benson v. United States*, 2026 WL 628772 at \*8 (D.C. Cir. March 5, 2026). The Supreme Court has made clear that the Second Amendment extends to all bearable arms, including modern arms. *Caetano v. Massachusetts*, 577 U.S. 411 (2016). Defendants do not dispute that Minnesota’s law prohibits arms-bearing conduct.

The burden therefore shifts to Defendants, and they have not met their burden. The relevant historical inquiry—whether the arms are “in common use for lawful purposes”—is already resolved by *Heller* and the undisputed record. *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 627 (citing *United States v. Miller*, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939); *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 21; *Benson*, 2026 WL 628772 at \*9. Switchblades are widely possessed, broadly available, and lawful in the vast majority of jurisdictions. ECF No. 45, at 18-22. Accordingly, arms in common use are, by definition, not “unusual,” and cannot be categorically banned. *Benson*, at \*9 (“*Heller* already made clear that the only historical tradition of banning arms extended only to those arms that are dangerous and unusual, and because arms in ubiquitous use are by definition not unusual, they cannot be banned outright”).

Even if the Court were to revisit the historical analysis, Defendants identify no Founding-era or 19th century analogue remotely resembling Minnesota’s switchblade ban. Instead, they rely on later laws and unsupported

assertions—backed by “experts” that lack any reliable foundation—while ignoring the undisputed evidence that switchblades are ordinary, ubiquitous tools no more dangerous than other lawful pocketknives.

Plaintiffs request that summary judgment be entered in their favor and that Defendants’ cross-motion be denied.

## ARGUMENT

### **I. Defendants Misstate the Governing Second Amendment Framework**

Defendants’ opposition does not apply the framework mandated by *Heller* and reaffirmed in *Bruen*. *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 17, 24. Instead, they attempt to repackage the rejected, interest-balancing approach into threshold hurdles that Plaintiffs must satisfy before the Second Amendment even applies.

As Plaintiffs have already shown, if the Second Amendment’s plain text covers the conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct, and the burden shifts to the government to justify its restriction by demonstrating consistency with the Nation’s historical tradition of arms regulation. *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 17, 24.

Under *Heller*, the textual analysis is simple. The Second Amendment protects the right of “the people” to “keep and bear Arms,” which extends to all bearable weapons—“all instruments that constitute bearable arms.” 554 U.S.

at 580–82. To “keep” arms is to *possess* them, and to “bear” arms is to carry them for the purpose of being armed *in case of confrontation*. *Id.* at 584, 592. Nothing in that inquiry requires a showing that an arm is commonly *used* in self-defense or turns on its alleged “dangerousness.”

Moreover, the court in *Benson* held that

*Bruen* . . . echoed what *Heller* had to say about categorical bans on arms, . . . [and] . . . the Court has already done the historical inquiry for us: categorical bans on arms can be justified where the arms in question are sufficiently dangerous and unusual, but outright bans on arms in common use for lawful purposes are a non-starter under the Second Amendment.

*Id.*, at \*6.

Defendants replace that straightforward inquiry with a multi-prong merits test, insisting that Plaintiffs must show both that switchblades are commonly used in self-defense and that they are not “unusually dangerous” before they qualify as protected arms. That is not the law. The Supreme Court has never imposed a “self-defense usage” requirement at the textual stage, nor has it treated “dangerousness” as a threshold limitation on what constitutes an “arm.”

Those arguments, if at all applicable (and they are not), are addressed at the historical stage. Indeed, *Heller* did not mention the “common use” inquiry until addressing historical precedents approximately forty pages after completing its textual inquiry. *Id.*, at 621-626. *Heller* and *Bruen* make clear

that categorical bans are permissible only for weapons that are *both* “dangerous and unusual,” as distinguished from those “in common use.” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 627; *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 21; *Caetano*, 577 U.S. at 417 (Alito, J., concurring). It is a conjunctive test. An arm may not be banned simply because it is alleged to be dangerous; it must also be unusual. And if an arm is in common use, it is, by definition, not unusual. *Benson*, at \*6, \*9.

Defendants’ import those historical considerations into the threshold textual inquiry; and in doing so, both misstate the governing framework and improperly shift the burden to Plaintiffs. Under the correct standard, once the ban is shown to restrict the possession of bearable arms, the burden falls on Defendants to justify that prohibition under the Nation’s historical tradition.

Accordingly, the dispositive question is not whether Defendants can assemble analogues to justify a ban in the abstract. The Supreme Court has already held that categorical prohibitions are impermissible unless the arm at issue is both dangerous and unusual. The question is whether switchblades fall within that narrow category. As shown below, they do not.

## **II. The Ban Regulates Conduct Covered by the Second Amendment’s Plain Text**

The threshold question is whether Minnesota’s switchblade ban regulates arms-bearing conduct covered by the Second Amendment’s plain

text—*i.e.*, whether it burdens the right of “the people to keep and bear Arms.” It does.

If a law restricts the possession or carry of a bearable arm, it falls within the Second Amendment’s text. Minnesota’s statute does exactly that. It criminalizes the possession of switchblades — folding knives that are indisputably bearable and used in the same manner, and for the same lawful purposes, as other lawful knives. Accordingly, the Second Amendment prohibits the right of “the people” to “keep” and “bear” “Arms.” The threshold textual question has been answered.

Importantly, Defendants do not dispute that switchblades are bearable arms. Nor could they. A switchblade fits neatly within the Supreme Court’s definition of “arms.” Unable to contest this fact, Defendants attempt to impose an additional requirement—that Plaintiffs must show switchblades are commonly used in self-defense before they are even considered “arms.” ECF No. 40, p.13-17; *Id.*, 51, p.3-7. Not so. *Heller’s* textual analysis of “to keep” and “to bear” unequivocally requires only ownership or possession and not use in self-defense. *Id.*, 554 U.S. at 582-584.

The burden therefore shifts to Defendants to justify the ban under the Nation’s historical tradition during the relevant era. And even if this Court were to reconduct *Heller’s* historical analysis of arms bans described above,

Defendants cannot justify this ban because there are no statutes that banned the possession of any knife during the colonial, Founding era, or throughout the entire 1800s. Appendix, KR1121-1126, 1157-1158.

### **III. Switchblades are in Common Use for Lawful Purposes**

Defendants' ban rises or falls on a single premise—that switchblades are not in common use for lawful purposes. They have not, and cannot, satisfy that premise.

The Second Amendment protects arms “typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 625. It does not require proof that an arm is frequently used in self-defense. Defendants' attempt to impose a “self-defense usage” requirement finds no support in *Heller*, *Bruen*, or any controlling authority. The relevant inquiry is common use—not frequency of use. *Id.* at 627.

Defendants' authorities do not alter that rule. *United States v. Price* did not limit common use to self-defense but reaffirmed it is for lawful purposes. 111 F.4th 392, 405 (4th Cir. 2024). And the unpublished decision in *In re Welfare of S.M.L.* does not conduct a *Bruen*-compliant analysis of a categorical ban. 2011 WL 2750298 (Minn. Ct. App. July 18, 2011).

Under the correct standard, Plaintiffs' showing is straightforward. Switchblades are widely possessed by law-abiding citizens, broadly available

through ordinary commercial channels, fall within the most common category of knives—pocketknives—and are legal in most jurisdictions. ECF No. 45, p.18–22. That evidence is undisputed.

Defendants’ dismissal of that evidence as “irrelevant” or “simplistic” fails. As *Benson* explains, ownership and prevalence data are not “too simplistic”—they are “right on point” in determining common use. *Id.* at \*11. The same is true of jurisdictional legality: where an arm is widely lawful, widely owned, and broadly available, it is necessarily in common use and cannot be banned. *Id.* at \*12.

Unable to rebut that evidence, Defendants rely on the lay opinion of Robert Escobar, who admits he is not an expert and bases his conclusions on a few “best-of” articles. Appendix, KR1033-1036. That is not evidence of uncommon use. The Second Amendment does not protect only those arms the government deems “optimal” or “recommended”—it protects those that Americans possess for lawful purposes.

#### **IV. The “Dangerous and Unusual” Inquiry is not Separate from “Common Use” and is Dispositive**

Defendants’ fallback argument—that switchblades may be banned because they are “unusually dangerous”—fails at the outset. The “dangerous and unusual” standard is not a separate inquiry from *Heller’s* common-use test;

it is its inverse. Because switchblades are in common use, they are not “unusual,” and the analysis ends there.

Defendants attempt to evade this rule by collapsing “dangerous and unusual” into a single concept, effectively arguing that arms may be banned if they are “especially” dangerous. But as *Benson* explains, treating the phrase as a hendiadys is a “tortured argument” that cannot be reconciled with *Heller* and *Bruen*. *Id.*, at \*10. The test is conjunctive, and common use forecloses the second requirement.

Nor does an arm’s relative “dangerousness” remove it from constitutional protection where it is commonly possessed. *Caetano*, 577 U.S. at 417. If it did, *Heller* would have come out differently. Handguns are dangerous, concealable, and frequently used in crime, yet the Supreme Court held they could not be banned because they are in common use for lawful purposes. *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 628–29; *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 21–22.

Defendants’ theory would invert that rule by allowing prohibition of any effective arm simply by labeling it “dangerous.” The record does not support their premise. The undisputed evidence—including Defendants’ own experts—confirms that switchblades are functionally indistinguishable from and no more dangerous than other lawful folding knives, differing only in their

opening mechanism. ECF No. 45, p.25–30. They are widely used for ordinary lawful purposes,<sup>2</sup> and no expert testimony suggests otherwise. *Id.*

Defendants offer no empirical evidence to the contrary, relying instead on anecdotal observations from a few law enforcement officials in 1958. ECF No. 51, p.5–6. They cannot dismiss modern evidence of lawful use and ownership as “irrelevant” while relying on unverified, anecdotes.

Further, Defendants make no showing that switchblades are “unusual.” They do not dispute that such knives are widely available, broadly lawful, and commonly possessed by law-abiding citizens. ECF No. 51, at 3–7. Their only claim—that Plaintiffs have not shown common use in self-defense—misstates the governing standard. Under *Heller*, that is not the test. Because switchblades are in common use, they are not unusual, and their relative “dangerousness” is irrelevant. See ECF No. 45, p.6–10, 25–30.

## **V. Defendants Fail to Identify any Historical Tradition Supporting a Ban**

Defendants’ attempt to justify Minnesota’s categorical ban under *Bruen*’s historical framework fails for two independent reasons.

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<sup>2</sup> Switchblades do not share the characteristics of so-called “fighting knives,” and Defendants’ purported expert concedes switchblades are used for ordinary lawful purposes. Appendix, KR1039, KR1030, KR1134-1137.

**First**, *Heller* already resolved the historical question for bans on arms. **Second**, even if this Court were to conduct that analysis anew, Defendants identify no relevant historical analogue.

**A. Defendants Misuse Bruen’s “How and Why” Framework**

Setting aside *Heller*’s binding historical analysis, Defendants’ reliance on *Bruen*’s “how and why” framework is misplaced.

*Bruen* did not authorize analogical reasoning untethered from history. Where the historical inquiry is straightforward—“[w]hen a challenged regulation addresses a general societal problem that has persisted since the 18th century”—the government must identify “a distinctly similar historical regulation addressing that problem.” *Bruen*, 597 U.S. at 26. Only in cases involving “unprecedented societal concerns” or “dramatic technological changes” may courts apply a more nuanced inquiry considering “how and why” a regulation burdens the right to armed self-defense. *Id.* at 26–30. Even then, the analysis remains anchored in historical analogues, not generalized policy judgments. *Id.*

That distinction explains *Rahimi*. There, the Court addressed a modern legal mechanism—domestic-violence restraining orders—for which no direct historical analogue existed. *Rahimi*, 602 U.S. 680 (2024). Faced with that novelty, the Court looked to historically analogous regulations, such as surety

laws, considering the “how and why” of those regulations to assess whether the modern restriction was comparable in its burden and justification. *Id.* at 692, 698, 700; *Benson*, at \*6.

Outside of such circumstances, however, *Bruen* requires concrete historical analogues—not abstractions. Defendants invert that rule by treating the narrow exception as the default and relying on generalized appeals to “dangerous” or “concealable” weapons rather than identifying any distinctly similar historical regulation.

This case presents no such novelty. Knives—including so-called “fighting knives”—and concerns about their misuse were well understood at the Founding and throughout the 19th century. Appendix, KR190, 195, 282, 709, 770, 1157. Defendants do not contend otherwise; they identify no “dramatic technological change” and no “unprecedented societal concern.” They therefore cannot invoke *Bruen*’s nuanced “how and why” framework and must instead identify a distinctly similar historical regulation banning possession. They cannot do so.

Measured against *Bruen*, Defendants’ analogues fail. Minnesota’s law imposes a categorical ban on possession, while the historical laws they cite regulated only the manner of carry or targeted misuse. ECF No. 45, at 34–37. The law referenced by Defendants did not prohibit possession, sale, or

ownership. A restriction on how a weapon may be carried is not analogous to a categorical prohibition on whether it may be possessed at all.

Nor are the purposes comparable. Historical regulations of concealed carry targeted preventing criminal conduct using concealed weapons—not the broad disarmament of the population based on a weapon’s perceived dangerousness. As Defendants’ own expert acknowledges, even at the height of 19th-century knife violence, state legislatures regulated *conduct* rather than banning knives outright. Appendix, KR1152–1153. And while Defendants reject any “use it or lose it” principle, the undisputed historical record remains—from before the Founding through 1900, there is no evidence that legislatures ever imposed a categorical ban on the possession of any kind of knife.

### **C. Defendants Cannot Evade a Facial Challenge**

Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs’ facial challenge fails because the statute might have constitutional applications is equally unavailing. They assert that the facial challenge fails because, under *United States v. Veasley*, 98 F.4th 906 (8th Cir. 2024), the statute survives if it can constitutionally be applied to “some” subset of conduct—such as carrying a switchblade concealed in public or in sensitive places. ECF No. 51, p.10-11. That argument fails because it does not defend the statute Minnesota enacted. It rewrites it.

Minnesota did not enact a sensitive-places law, a public-carry law, or a manner-of-carry restriction. It enacted a complete ban on the “manufacture[], transfer[], or possess[ion]” of switchblades. Defendants cannot save this categorical ban by hypothesizing narrower laws the Minnesota Legislature never enacted.

*Further*, despite Defendants’ reliance on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in *Knife Rights, Inc., v. Bonta* (pending *en banc* review), other Ninth Circuit precedent contradicts this application. *Baird v. Bonta*, 163 F.4th 723, 745-747 (9th Cir. 2026).

Additionally, in *Benson*, the district argued a near-identical argument that even if its magazine ban were unconstitutional, the facial challenge should fail because defendant possessed a 30-round magazine and because some narrower ban might have been permissible. *Id.* at \*15. The court in *Benson* rejected that argument in detail:

“The 11+ magazine ban is facially unconstitutional because it is unconstitutional on its plain terms, not just in some idiosyncratic applications, and it is not readily susceptible to any judicial narrowing that avoids its constitutional infirmities.”

*Id.* at \*15.

The court in *Benson* continued, “that it captures some conduct that hypothetically could have been proscribed by a more narrow statute is beside the point.” As *Benson* explained, the statute fails because it “draws [the] line

in a constitutionally protected place” and is not susceptible to narrowing. *Id.*, at \*15–16. In a facial challenge, courts “look only to whether the statute properly proscribes criminal conduct,” not whether similar conduct “could have been criminalized under a hypothetical statute.” *Id.*

That reasoning applies here. Even if Minnesota could have enacted some narrower regulation directed at concealed carry, sensitive places, or particular misuse, that says *nothing* about the constitutionality of the statute before this Court. The challenged law does not require Defendants to prove public carry, concealment, sensitive-place possession, misuse, criminal intent, or any other narrowing fact. It criminalizes manufacture, transfer, and possession. Defendants do not identify a constitutional application of this statute; they identify different *hypothetical statutes* that might have been enacted but were not.

As the Supreme Court and *Benson* have recognized, the question is whether the law “is unconstitutional on its plain terms,” not whether the court can imagine a narrower law that would be constitutional. ECF No. 45, p.30-34. That is not the facial-challenge doctrine; it is *post hoc* statutory revision.

Nor does *United States v. Veasley* assist Defendants. *Veasley* involved a status-based federal prohibition that, *by its terms*, applied across a wide range of individuals and circumstances, some of which the Eighth Circuit concluded

had constitutional applications. 98 F.4th 906, 910 (8th Cir. 2024), *cert. denied*, 145 S. Ct. 304 (2024); *see also* ECF No. 45, at 33-34. By contrast, Defendants have not identified constitutional applications of the statute *as written*.

Defendants' argument also directly conflicts with *Heller*. The Court did not uphold the District's handgun ban because handguns could have been regulated in some narrower contexts. It struck the ban down because it prohibited "an entire class of 'arms'" chosen by Americans for lawful purposes. *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 628. And the Supreme Court made clear, "[i]t is no answer" that other arms remain available. *Id.* at 629. Defendants simply repackage that same flawed logic: because Minnesota might have enacted narrower restrictions, this blanket ban should survive. *Heller* holds otherwise.

Moreover, *Bruen* held plaintiffs facial challenge to New York's proper cause requirement unconstitutional. It did so despite that within New York there are many locations in which concealed carry could be restricted, such as courthouses. 597 U.S. at 30-31. That New York could *hypothetically* restrict concealed carry within a courthouse was not a constitutional application of the challenged law in *Bruen*.

## **VI. Escobar's Testimony Is Inadmissible Under Rule 702**

Defendants' reliance on Mr. Escobar fails. Pls. Mem. at 7–8, 24–28, 40–42. As shown, his opinions are inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence

702 because he lacks relevant expertise, employs no reliable methodology, and relies on no sufficient factual basis. Defendants’ opposition does not cure those defects.

Defendants again rely on Mr. Escobar to opine that switchblades are dangerous and unsuitable for self-defense, but he admits he lacks expertise in the relevant field. That alone is dispositive. His background in martial arts and general self-defense does not include any curriculum in knife use, and none of his published work addresses the use or dangerousness of knives in self-defense. Appendix, KR983, KR991-995. Nor does his claimed expertise in the “origins and uses of switchblades” provide any foundation—he has authored no work on switchblades, has no professional experience involving them, and identifies no specialized study of their design, manufacture, or use. *Id.*, and ECF No. 45, p.25–28, 40–42.

His methodology fares no better. Defendants’ central claim—that “tactical knife article-based recommendations suggest a lack of commonality”—rests entirely on his review of six “best-of” articles identified through a single internet search for “best tactical knives of 2025.” Appendix, KR1033-1036. He identifies no ownership data, no market data, no empirical studies, and no historical analysis. Instead, he admits his understanding of switchblade “use” is derived from a “sociocultural feedback loop” and “popular

culture amplification.” Appendix, KR1017. This is speculation grounded in media narratives.

Nor does Mr. Escobar rebut Plaintiffs’ evidence. He does not dispute that switchblades are sold in large numbers in the United States and admits he has “nothing else quantifiable” beyond the limited materials he reviewed. Appendix, KR1047, KR1084. His testimony therefore provides no basis to contradict Plaintiffs’ showing of common use.

Defendants offer no admissible expert testimony to support their claims. Mr. Escobar’s opinions are unsupported, unreliable, and excludable.

## **VII. Professor Roth’s Testimony Should Be Limited**

Professor Roth is a historian of violence, but the historical record he identifies—and his own testimony regarding that record—undermine Defendants’ claims.

He admits he is not aware of any Colonial or Founding-era laws regulating the sale, purchase, use, ownership, possession, or manufacture of knives, and concedes that “during the 1800s, there were no laws that banned the possession of any kind of knife.” ECF No. 45, at 35–36. The statutes he identifies “almost exclusively” regulated concealed carry, not possession, and did not prohibit the sale, purchase, ownership, or open carry of knives. *Id.*

His testimony is also temporally limited. He admits his research does not extend into the 20th century and that he has not studied the criminal use of switchblades during that period. Appendix, KR1164. He offers no support for Defendants' claims regarding the alleged dangerousness or criminal use of switchblades in the modern era. He cannot support claims about 20th century switchblade use because he admits he has not studied the period. *Id.*

At bottom, Professor Roth establishes only that there were no historical possession bans and that the regulations he identifies were limited to manner-of-carry restrictions. Defendants' reliance on his testimony to justify a modern possession ban exceeds the record and his expertise.

### **VIII. Defendants Mischaracterize Plaintiffs' Experts and Fail to Identify any Basis for Exclusion Under Rule 702**

Defendants' challenge to Plaintiffs' experts mischaracterizes both their opinions and Rule 702. Defendants identify no defect in qualification, methodology, or factual basis sufficient to warrant exclusion.

**First**, Defendants incorrectly assert that Plaintiffs' experts' opinions on commonality rest solely on "personal experience" and lack factual support. The record shows otherwise. Plaintiffs' experts rely on specialized knowledge of the knife industry—including manufacturing, design, sales, and distribution—combined with analysis of knife function, operation, and ordinary uses, and historical materials. Appendix, KR721–723, KR766-768, KR785-787. They are

leading experts in the knife and self-defense fields, with over a century of combined experience across the largest manufacturers, retailers, and distributors, and involvement in thousands of knife designs and patents. *Id.* This is precisely the type of knowledge and experience Rule 702 contemplates.

Defendants' impose an empirical-data requirement that fares no better. Rule 702 does not require independent statistical studies. Experience-based testimony is admissible where, as here, the expert explains how that experience informs the opinion. Plaintiffs' experts do exactly that. Appendix, KR720–790.

Defendants' reliance on *United States v. Vesey* and *Synergetics, Inc. v. Hurst* are misplaced. Those decisions require only that the expert's reasoning be explained and connected to the opinion offered. 338 F.3d 913, 917 (8th Cir. 2003); 477 F.3d 949, 955 (8th Cir. 2007). Plaintiffs' experts satisfy that requirement. Appendix, KR720–790.

**Second**, Defendants' claim that Plaintiffs' experts "did not conduct their own research" or rely on others again misstates the record. Rule 702 imposes no such requirement. Experts may rely on professional experience, industry knowledge, and review of relevant materials. Defendants identify no authority holding otherwise.

More fundamentally, Defendants ignore the nature of the inquiry. Commonality is not a technical question requiring laboratory testing or statistical modeling. It is an assessment of whether an arm is typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes. Experts with extensive experience in the knife industry and knife use are well-positioned to inform that analysis. Defendants' insistence on undefined "methodology" is an attempt to exclude testimony they cannot rebut.

**Third**, Defendants' relevance argument fails. That Plaintiffs' experts address knives beyond those subject to the switchblade ban does not render their opinions irrelevant. Switchblades are a subset of folding knives, and testimony regarding the design, function, availability, and common uses of knives generally are relevant to whether switchblades fall within a broader class of commonly possessed arms.

## **CONCLUSION**

For all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs request that this Court issue an order finding that the challenged statute is unconstitutional and that it be permanently enjoined.

April 17, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

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